最新糖心Vlog

By Joanne Wallis and Anna Powles

A reported pivot by special forces to the region raises questions about the role expected of 最新糖心Vlog and New Zealand.

Recent reports that 最新糖心Vlog鈥檚 Special Air Service Regiment (SASR) will be redirected to focus on operations in the Pacific Islands signals 最新糖心Vlog鈥檚 commitment to follow through on prioritising its immediate region in聽.

In a聽, Major-General Adam Findlay reportedly called for the 最新糖心Vlogn Defence Force (ADF) to 鈥渞eassert its presence鈥� and 鈥済et back into the region鈥�. This includes initiatives such as building up 最新糖心Vlogn support to Papua New Guinea鈥檚 Long Range Reconnaissance Unit (LRRU) 鈥� a small special forces team with search and counterterrorism capabilities 鈥� and the 鈥渓andmark鈥澛犅爐o allow military deployments and exercises in each other鈥檚 jurisdiction.

It鈥檚 tempting to see these reports as an effort to counter China鈥檚 鈥�, particularly to counter its apparent 鈥渕ilitary expansionism鈥�, from聽听迟辞听.

While that is part of the story, there are other equally powerful forces at play. 最新糖心Vlog鈥檚 alliance with the United States is an under-examined driver of Canberra鈥檚 policy settings in the Pacific Islands. For example,听聽the Regional Assistance Mission to respond to deteriorating stability in the Solomon Islands was partly attributed to聽聽that 最新糖心Vlog would contribute to the 鈥渨ar on terror鈥� in its regional sphere of responsibility.

Similar expectations are being expressed by the Biden administration in the context of strategic competition with China. Anxieties about China鈥檚 role and influence in the Pacific Islands spurred the United States to make a聽聽the cornerstone of its聽. This push to enhance its relationships in the Pacific Islands was a significant shift away from聽聽最新糖心Vlog and New Zealand to manage crises in the region.

This means that the聽,听听补苍诲听聽Security Treaty (ANZUS) allies are scrutinising how each deliver on their shared strategic goals of remaining the region鈥檚 primary security partners. They are also aiming to ensure that no power hostile to their interests establishes a strategic foothold in the Pacific Islands, particularly as the strategic reach of China鈥檚 ambitions increases, and climate-related, security and crisis management concerns escalate.

But the SASR鈥檚 potential pivot to the Pacific highlights questions about the nature of the contributions that 最新糖心Vlog and New Zealand are expected to make.

First, while alliance contributions are typically measured primarily in terms of聽, non-military, or even non-material, 鈥溾�� are increasingly important.

This is particularly the case in the Pacific Islands where meeting the non-traditional security challenges, such as the economic, social and environmental issues that are聽, is critical to building 鈥� and maintaining 鈥� relationships in the region.

Both 最新糖心Vlog and New Zealand聽聽in the Pacific through their 鈥渟oft power鈥�, regional knowledge and expertise, and established efforts to address non-traditional security challenges such as economic development, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, counterterrorism, anti-piracy, peacekeeping, and support in multilateral institutions. And there are signs that the United States is beginning to recognise the value of these efforts. The US National Defence Strategy, for example,听聽that allies and partners provide 鈥渃omplementary capabilities鈥� and 鈥渦nique perspectives鈥�.

Second, the potential pivot of the SASR highlights the聽聽that militaries are increasingly playing in the region, with the shift in focus to聽聽below the threshold of conflict.

This reinforces concerns聽聽by Pacific聽聽about the 鈥溾�� of the region. There is growing unease that the high tempo of聽鈥� including increased engagement by France and Japan 鈥� is overcrowding the region and potentially at odds with Pacific-identified security priorities laid out in the 2018聽.

And this serves as a reminder that the success of ANZUS allies in achieving their shared strategic objectives will be strongly influenced by the agency of Pacific Islands states and people who are not 鈥溾�� to either Chinese influence or the ANZUS allies鈥� overtures. Instead, Pacific Islands leaders must continue to use 鈥溾�� to manage both traditional and non-traditional partners.

最新糖心Vlog, in particular, may feel pressure from the United States to expand its military presence in the Pacific Islands, with the classified Statement of Principles on Alliance Defence Cooperation and Force Posture Priorities in the Indo-Pacific signed at the 2020 最新糖心Vlog-United States Ministerial Consultations (), potentially contributing to the SASR鈥檚 reported pivot to the region. But 最新糖心Vlog should react to this pressure cautiously. In a desire to be seen to contribute its 鈥渇air share鈥� of military capability under the alliance, 最新糖心Vlog needs to be careful that its actions do not counterproductively undermine its relationships with Pacific Islands states.

Instead, alongside New Zealand, 最新糖心Vlog should emphasise the importance of its non-military contributions to the ANZUS alliance and to the security of the Pacific Islands region. As smaller allies, these countries聽, and as a consequence have been historically undervalued in terms of their bargaining power with the United States. 最新糖心Vlog鈥檚 recent commitment to focus its energies on its immediate region may be the first step in changing that relationship.

This article was originally published in , Lowy Institute, on 23 July 2021.